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This paper scrutinizes the recent proposal made by Lassiter (2008) that the 
dichotomy between Chomskyan internalism and Dummett-type externalism 
is misguided and should be overcome by an approach that incorporates 
sociolinguistic concepts such as speakers’ dispositions to defer. We argue 
that Lassiter’s arguments are flawed and based on a serious misunder-
standing of the internalist approach to the study of natural language, failing 
to appreciate its methodological nature and conclude that Lassiter’s socio-
linguistic approach is just another instance of externalist attempts with little 
hope of scientific achievement.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In a recent paper, Lassiter (2008) argues that both the Chomskyan internalist 
approach to human language and the Dummett-type externalism fail to provide 
an account of some semantic and social facts that he claims are crucial to any 
linguistic theory. Furthermore, Lassiter claims that we can overcome such 
difficulties in these two approaches by incorporating some sociolinguistic notions 
into linguistic theory. We will argue that Lassiter’s claim is misguided, and that 
he misunderstands crucial aspects of the Chomskyan internalist project.  
 We will first provide an overview of Lassiter’s claims, and then examine 
his critique of the internalist project, and discuss why the alternative he presents 
is highly problematic. We take the failure of his externalist theory to be rather 
suggestive of the general feasibility of any scientific investigation of language 
that rests mainly on an externalist foundation.  
 
 
2. Lassiter’s Claims 
 
This section is devoted to an overview of the argument presented in Lassiter 
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(2008). Before we proceed, we have to clarify some of the terminology Lassiter 
misleadingly adopts. Throughout his paper, Lassiter repeatedly attributes to 
Noam Chomsky and generative linguistics led by him (which he often calls 
‘descriptive linguistics’) a claim that “a language just is a mental grammar” (p. 
619) and calls such a claim ‘individualism’. Individualism, as he construes, is a 
claim that semantic properties, such as reference, of an individual’s speech 
behavior rest exclusively on, and can be explained solely by, the facts and 
knowledge internal to the individual. This is in itself a serious misrepresentation 
of the Chomskyan internalism (Chomsky 1995, 2000), as we will argue in the next 
section, but since his discussion rests heavily on this misrepresentation, we will 
adopt it and review his arguments with regard to this straw man hypothesis. In 
order to avoid unnecessary vagueness in terminology, let us tentatively call the 
‘individualism’ under his particular conception sketched here L-individualism. 
 In a nutshell, Lassiter’s claim is that (i) there are some sociological facts of 
human linguistic behavior that can be accounted for only by a linguistic theory 
that incorporates individuals’ intentional contributions to the meaning/reference 
of linguistic expressions, and (ii) neither L-individualism nor the philosophically 
dominant tradition of semantic externalism (led by people like Hilary Putnam, 
Tyler Burge, Michael Dummett, and David Lewis) can satisfy this need. We will 
articulate these points in what follows. 
 Basing his argument primarily on observations made by externalists such 
as those just mentioned, Lassiter claims that there are certain ‘crucial’ socio-
linguistic facts of human speech behavior that highlight the relevance of social 
contexts in a speech community and also of speakers’ intentions. A primary 
example of this kind is, according to him, individuals’ intuitions about the 
‘(in)correctness’ of their language use against the standards of the speech 
community they belong to. Lassiter notes, “sometimes an individual’s use of 
language is just wrong, and individuals often acknowledge making mistakes 
upon reflection or correction” (p. 608). As an illustration, he takes a familiar 
example from Burge (1979), where we are asked to imagine an English-speaking 
individual, say Jim, who has rheumatism in his thigh but suspects he has arthritis 
as a result of having an ailment in his thigh. This individual, not being a doctor, 
does not know that arthritis is a condition of the joints only, and so when he 
utters “I have arthritis in my thigh,” he is expressing a false belief. In such a 
circumstance, however, Jim should be able to become aware of his mistake, for 
example, by being explicitly corrected by a doctor. Given this much, Lassiter 
argues that “a descriptive theory emphasizing knowledge of language” would pre-
dict (wrongly, as he argues) that his utterance above is not false but rather is just 
“true-in-his-idiolect” (p. 609), which he regards as a serious flaw of such a theory. 
That is, he argues with Burge that the reference of ‘arthritis’ in such a case is 
rather fixed by the word’s use in the speech community Jim belongs to. 
 Furthermore, Lassiter claims that L-individualism is seriously flawed in 
that it does not provide any room for language-external concepts such as speech 
communities and community standards for normative meaning, in its account of 
sociologically and contextually varying semantic properties of human speech 
behaviors, as in Jim’s cases above. In this regard, Lassiter more or less endorses 
Dummett’s (1986) claim that an individual’s knowledge of his language is merely 
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“a second-order theory: a partial, and partly incorrect, theory about what the 
meanings of the expressions are in the common language, that may be represen-
ted as a partial theory of what the correct theory of meaning for the language is” 
(Dummett 1986: 469). 
 However, Lassiter also claims that we should not take at face value the 
strong form of externalism that Dummett and other externalists like Putnam and 
Lewis envisage. His target is what he calls communitarianism, a position implicitly 
or explicitly shared by these externalists’ approaches which holds that a language 
is primarily a social object belonging to a speech community, and that such 
speech communities exist prior to individual speakers and are capable of 
determining a unique community language (a communalect, in his terms) with or 
without the individual speakers’ cooperation (p. 610). Lassiter argues that we 
should reject communitarianism, because it makes a clearly unsustainable 
prediction that ‘speech communities’ that communalects correspond to should be 
determinate and isolable real objects that we can find in the world. The problem 
of this prediction lies in the difficulties in isolating the relevant speech communi-
ties in a well-articulated fashion. For example, we cannot define a community 
corresponding to a communalect language neither by political or institutional 
boundaries, nor by communicative notions like mutual intelligibility. It is by now 
an established fact that languages vary both synchronically over geographical 
and sociopolitical space and diachronically over generations, and moreover that 
such variation is rather continuous and gradual in most cases, without any sharp 
divisions in terms of geographic space, sociopolitical boundaries, generation 
gaps, or mutual intelligibility. Consequently, as Lassiter argues, we should give 
up any hope to find any objective or absolute criteria for isolating speech 
communities, which in effect militates against the backbone of communitarianist 
approaches.  
 He then goes on to suggest that his sociolinguistic approach to semantics 
can overcome both the difficulties in L-individualism and those in communi-
tariarism. His alternative theory posits that “the meaning of a word in the mouth 
of a speaker S is determined by S’s dispositions to defer to other speakers with 
regard to the meaning and use of this word” (p. 623). For example, as for the 
rheumatism patient Jim in Burge’s example, he notes, “if we wish to know what 
‘arthritis’ means in Jim’s mouth, we must ask who Jim would defer to with 
regard to the meaning of this word” (p. 622), say, his doctor, in which case his 
utterance. “I have arthritis in my thigh” can be still said to be expressing a wrong 
belief, since “he would be willing to change his use if he were to go [to see the 
doctor—L&N]” (p. 623). This way, we can make room for the effect of the 
speaker’s intuitions of correctness by relocating the effect of normativity to the 
speaker’s dispositions to defer, without making recourse to the dubious commu-
nitarianist notion of speech community. 
 
 
3. The Externalism vs. Internalism Debate 
 
To begin with, let us first state clearly that we have no problem in accepting 
Lassiter’s counterarguments to L-individualism and communitariarism as such, 
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since they both seem dubious, although we don’t regard his argumentation as 
particularly strong. What we regard as particularly misguided and problematic is 
his continuous misrepresentation of Chomsky’s internalism (Chomsky 1995, 
2000) as L-individualism. In our opinion, L-individualism is a straw man hypo-
thesis that says that the meaning of an individual’s speech is to be determined 
solely by facts internal to the individual. From this, Lassiter subsequently con-
cludes that the dichotomy between Chomsky’s position (again, misrepresented as 
L-individualism) and externalism is misguided and to be remedied by 
“unify[ing] the two approaches” under the realm of sociolinguistics (p. 607).  
Lassiter’s “broad outlines of the debate” say, on the one hand, that 
internalists “believe that the proper object of the scientific study of language is 
the language of an individual, his idiolect or, in Chomskyan terms, his mental 
grammar, knowledge of language, or I-language. […] This does not necessarily 
mean that social aspects of language are unimportant or that they do not admit of 
a scientific description, though some [internalists] have made this further claim: 
cf. Chomsky (1975). However, most [internalists] do believe that only individual-
listic aspects of language can be formalized and used to make predictions (e.g., 
about entailment and grammaticality)” (p. 608). Elsewhere, he also (correctly) 
attributes to Chomsky the claim that “only the ‘internalist’ aspects of language 
can admit of a truly scientific description” (p. 631). On the other hand, semantic 
externalists “hold that a language belongs to a community of language users, and 
that common languages or communalects exist above and beyond individuals. 
According to this conception, a language has an ontology (e.g., words and gram-
matical rules, or social practices and/or conventions) and norms (standards of 
correctness) that are in some sense independent of the linguistic competence of 
individual speakers” (p. 608). These two “broad outlines” seem to be a sufficient-
ly accurate approximation. Crucially, note that internalism thus understood is 
primarily a conjecture about a proper object of the scientific study of language (which 
internalists claim to be I-language), whereas externalism is rather a philosophical 
belief about the ontology of some mind/brain-external aspects of human linguistic 
behaviors (which would be E-language of some sort).  
 Typically, then, both positions would not, and Lassiter also does not, take 
issue with the fact that there exist aspects of language purely internal to the 
human mind/brain (i.e. I-language): Thus Lassiter’s remark, “I think mental 
grammars are fully real” (p. 619). Indeed, to the extent that the externalist propo-
sals are even coherent, they presuppose some notion of I-language, as Chomsky 
repeatedly has stressed (e.g., in Chomsky 2000). An I-language can in many ways 
be identified as a generative system — an I-language enables a speaker to 
generate linguistic expressions. It’s a (trivial) fact that speakers are able to gener-
ate an unlimited amount of hierarchically structured expressions. An I-language 
makes it possible to make sense of the linguistic creativity we all possess as hu-
man beings, a creativity that is unbounded, innovative and uncaused (Chomsky 
2009 [1966]; see also McGilvray 2009 on this). This linguistic creativity is in obvi-
ous ways individual: It is something that each person uses and how it is used is 
independent of how other people are using their linguistic creativity. The 
utterances that are generated are part of what is commonly called E-language. 
 However, E-language cannot exist without the utterances being generated 
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in some way or other. Certainly language cannot just appear out of nowhere. 
Hence individuals have to create it using their linguistic creativity. This creati-
vity, of which I-language is a crucial part, is by definition internal. One can 
debate what the exact content of I-language is, as people following Chomsky 
have done since the 1950s, but it is very hard to see that it is possible to debate 
the reality of I-language. If one wants to study E-language, one has to suppose 
the existence of some sort of I-language since E-language would not exist without 
I-language. One can choose not to focus on its existence, but it should be clear 
that it has to exist. More advanced examples can be adduced in support of this, 
involving central well-known empirical facts about human language that doesn’t 
create themselves (hierarchy, as mentioned above, but also structural relations 
like c-command and others that are crucial properties of I-languages). Thus, we 
take it for granted that it should be clear why an E-language approach is 
presupposing the existence of an I-language. 
 Surrounding the dichotomy between internalism and externalism are, then, 
(at least) two separate issues:  
 
(i) Whether we have reasons to believe in some ontology of ‘language’ outside 
of individuals’ mind/brain, and  
(ii) Whether we can ever construct a serious scientific theory of such 
‘language’.1 
 
Internalists like Chomsky would typically answer a skeptical “No” to (i) and (ii), 
as Lassiter correctly acknowledges. Externalists strongly answer “Yes” to (i), 
rooted in their philosophical belief in the existence of such an ‘object’. But they 
seem less concerned about arguing for an articulated “Yes” to (ii), as far as we 
can see. This is an important difference. For internalists, (i) is not really an impor-
tant research question, whereas (ii) is really the question they/we are concerned 
with. Again, this is an important methodological difference that bears emphasis, 
as Collins (2009) also underlines. 
 
 
4. Evaluating Lassiter’s Contributions 
 
Despite the sufficient accuracy of the “broad outlines of the debate” above, which 
is presented on the second page of his paper, Lassiter continuously misinterprets 
                                                
1  McGilvray (2002: 73) provides a nice exposition of what we have in mind for the term serious 
science:  
A serious science is a theory for which there is not only empirical support in the 
form of the descriptive and explanatory adequacy of a set of formal, explicit 
principles (adequate to their domain by standards that are universal, although 
adjusted to a specific domain) and evidence of progress (a history of revision of 
theories with good reason to think that there have been improvements in 
adequacy, simplicity, and explicit statement), but some reason to think that the 
theory’s principles can be accommodated to the principles of other, relevant 
sciences. In the science of mind, the relevant science would, presumably, be some 
branch of biology — perhaps a much-revised form of neurophysiology. 
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what internalism is all about elsewhere in his paper, and repeatedly mis-
represents it as L-individualism. For example, he makes the following odd claim: 
”In contrast to the assumptions of thinkers from Chomsky to Putnam, I do not 
think that externalism and mentalism are incompatible: I think mental grammars 
are fully real, though I do deny the claim that language just is a mental 
grammar” (p. 619). Here, Lassiter is attributing to Chomskyan internalism the 
“claim that language just is a mental grammar.” In the same vein, elsewhere he 
also says, “Individualists hold that an individual’s language just is her idiolect” 
(p. 610).2 This is a serious misrepresentation of the internalist claim. As noted 
above, the core claim of internalists who, like Chomsky, seek a naturalistic theory 
of language is that the proper object of a serious linguistic science should be 
organism-internal aspects of human language (namely I-language). Internalists 
never deny that there are phenomena broadly related to language (in particular 
to language use) that are beyond the narrow confines of the architecture of the 
human mental grammar (I-language). Such phenomena would surely include 
prescriptive pressures from the linguistic community, speakers’ intentionality for 
communicative success, and all sorts of other E-language phenomena that Lassi-
ter and others argue for. What internalists doubt is rather the feasibility and/or 
legitimacy of providing a serious science of any mind-external phenomena such 
as these. Thus, Chomsky (1995) writes: “[G]eneral issues of intentionality, inclu-
ding those of language use, cannot reasonably be assumed to fall within natural-
istic inquiry” (p. 27); see also Chomsky (2000) for much relevant discussion. 
 Cast in this real internalism vs. externalism debate, we cannot find any 
compelling reason to believe that Lassiter constructed even a relevant argument 
for his conclusion that “the choice between individualism [referring to the 
Chomskyan internalism] and externalism is a false one” (p. 630). He is mostly 
attacking the ‘claim that language just is a mental grammar’, i.e. the incorrect L-
individualism, a claim never defended by Chomsky, but Lassiter never addresses 
all the serious issues raised by the Chomskyan internalism that an externalist 
theory would have to face. Rather, his alleged ‘theory’ is just another instanti-
ation of externalism, expressing but not quite arguing for his intuitive “Yes” to (i) 
and (ii).  
 Let us now turn to the more specific aspects of Lassiter’s proposals, where 
we in particular will focus on important problems surrounding an E-language 
approach and why Chomsky and others have focused on studying I-language. 
As we have seen, Lassiter’s claims are as follows:  
 
(A) There are facts that cannot be addressed purely internalistically (such as in-
dividuals’ intuitions on (in)correctness of language use, e.g., the impreci-
sion of a rheumatism patient’s usage of the word ‘arthritis’, as seen above).  
                                                
2  An additional note on Lassiter’s terminology may be in order here. Throughout his paper, 
he uses the notion ‘idiolect’ as more or less synonymous with grammar or I-language. This 
is a misunderstanding. Never has Chomsky squared idiolect and I-language; on the 
contrary, he has been very explicit in numerous writings that idiolect and I-language are 
very different (e.g., Chomsky 1986, 2000). A notion like ‘idiolect’ is very much like ‘dialect’ 
and ‘language’; vague and ambiguous notions that are notoriously hard to define. This fact, 
together with the numerous other often remarkably vague notions used by Lassiter, makes 
it quite hard to assess his theory. 
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(B) Any linguistic theory must account for these facts. 
(C) We can actually construct (or at least imagine) an explanatory theory of 
such facts which incorporates externalist (I-language-external) concepts like 
speakers’ dispositions to defer to normativity or authority in their speech 
community. 
 
As for the claim in (A), we looked at an example borrowed from Burge where the 
meaning of a rheumatism patient’s word ‘arthritis’ is determined by who the 
speaker would defer to, and in what fashion. That is, if we want to know what 
the speaker meant to refer to by the word ‘arthritis’, we are told by Lassiter to ask 
who the speaker would defer to with regard to the meaning of this specific word. 
Internalists would have no problem accepting Lassiter’s mundane (and trivially 
true) claim that such notions as individuals’ dispositions to defer, and the E-
linguistic system (communalect) that the totality of a person’s dispositions to 
defer in a particular communicative situation map out, obviously go beyond a 
purely internalistic account. Thus (A) should not be at issue here. 
 However, internalists may very well be inclined to deny (B) and (C). As for 
(B), we fail to see any serious justification of this claim in Lassiter’s paper, apart 
from his personal belief that these facts regarding (A), like most phenomena 
investigated by sociolinguists, are of general interest. It is not clear that an 
internalist theory needs to take into account the facts of Lassiter’s interest, given 
that the past fifty years of generative investigation have provided more than 
ample evidence that the I-linguistic mental system can be fruitfully studied 
purely internalistically, under the abstraction from the external fluctuations from 
sociological circumstances or intentions of speakers or the like. Thus, nobody 
would claim that dispositions to defer or other sorts of an individual’s social 
intentions have any influence on the computational properties of the I-linguistic 
mechanism that generates the mental compositions of hierarchical structures of 
words and sentences. As long as they can construct and investigate the science of 
I-language, internalists are fine to admit that they have to leave whatever 
remains beyond the reach of their I-linguistic science for the time being, such as 
the facts that Lassiter and other externalists’ interest think are very important 
(see Chomsky 1995, 2000, McGilvray 2009, and Hinzen 2006a, 2006b, among 
others). In this regard, it is not clear what Lassiter thinks would go wrong if an 
internalist approach to human language set the facts of his interest aside, and left 
it to other disciplines such as sociolinguistics to investigate I-language-external 
facts. Lassiter never articulates his claim on this point, so we do not see any 
reason to abandon the internalist theory of I-language. In this regard, we 
completely agree with the following remark by Chomsky (1995: 50): “As for 
sociolinguistics, it is a perfectly legitimate inquiry, externalist by definition. It 
borrows from internalist inquiry into humans, but suggests no alternative to it.” 
By contrast, Lassiter somehow believes that not just some but any linguistic 
discipline must account for the relevant facts, but he never articulates why that 
should be. 
 More to the point, most internalists suspect that we need to understand the 
I-language much better than we currently do before we can even start to attempt 
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at pursuing some serious understanding of how I-language is embedded in 
sociolinguistic contexts, and specifically how the utterances generated with 
recourse to I-language are used in a given context to refer to things outside the 
head. Admittedly, internalists have scarcely started to understand how an I-
language that an individual possesses contributes to the semantico-pragmatic 
performance of that individual in a sufficiently comprehensive way, and thus it 
would be an inextricable leap at this point to broaden the object of study to 
individuals’ varying deference and any other E-linguistic notions; hopelessly 
complicating the task. We need a more complete understanding of the internal 
properties of I-language before we can even attempt to try to understand how 
individuals utilize them to deal with all sorts of E-language phenomena. This is a 
very different methodology than that of externalists, and a difference that 
Lassiter seems to have failed to notice. In total, we see that there are both 
theoretical and metholodogical reasons to be skeptical regarding (B) (cf. Collins 
2009). 
 Furthermore, it is hard to see how one could even imagine a successfully 
explanatory theory within the framework that Lassiter pursues given that he 
does not acknowledge the importance of I-language. In this regard, we side with 
Chomsky (1995, 2000) and McGilvray (1998, 2002, 2009), and many others, in be-
ing very skeptical about the feasibility of (C). The claim that we can construct or 
should be able to construct an explanatory theory of (E-)language by incorpora-
ting various sociolinguistic notions is central to Lassiter (2008). Unfortunately, 
Lassiter never defines crucial notions that are part of his theory, for example, 
‘deferential dispositions’, ‘communicative success’, ‘social identification’ or, 
elsewhere in the paper, important notions such as ‘norms’, ‘correctness’ and 
‘reference’, in a sufficiently meticulous way that enables us to derive predictions 
from his theory. Rather, to address these notions, he seems to borrow heavily 
from common sense understandings of these terms. However, we have no reason 
to expect that any commonsense understanding of words like these can merit 
scientific investigations. Compare Chomsky’s (1999: 113) remark: “[T]here is no 
reason to suppose that common usage of such terms as ‘language’ or ‘learning’ 
(or ‘belief’ or numerous others like them), or others belonging to similar semantic 
fields in other linguistic systems, will find any place in attempts to understand 
the aspects of the world to which they pertain, just as no one expects the common 
sense terms ‘energy’ or ‘liquid’ or ‘life’ to play a role in the sciences, beyond a 
rudimentary level” (see also Chomsky 1980). The point is much the same for 
Lassiter’s ‘deference’, ‘social identification’, ‘norms’, etc. Thus, it is hard to assess 
to what extent we are actually dealing with a theory here. 
 Related to this point is the fact that crucial aspects of Lassiter’s theory fail 
to provide obvious criteria for falsifiability. Whenever he encounters problematic 
examples, he stipulates some superficial elaboration of his terms in order to 
dismiss them. Consider the following illustrative case: “Recall that, in the case of 
Jim and his community’s deviant use of ‘arthritis’, we came to the conclusion that 
the deviant usage could be incorrect in certain circumstances (e.g., talking to the 
doctor), but it could just as well involve dialect-switching in which both usages 
are correct in different social contexts. In the latter case, some sort of translation 
manual would be in order” (p. 625). And as above, he never specifies what role 
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the newly invented terms like ‘dialect-switching’ and ‘translation manual’ are 
supposed to play in his theory. What seems to be going on here is that Lassiter 
allows there to be multiple ‘explanations’ for the same phenomenon. Moreover, 
there seem to be no principles behind these possible explanations. That is, no 
guidelines can be found that tell us where/when we should use explanation x 
and where/when we should use explanation y. Without such guidelines or prin-
ciples, the theory easily becomes vacuous. Though again, it might be eventually 
possible to develop such principles, but at least they are not stated in his paper. 
 Furthermore, Lassiter himself admits (correctly) that the crucial external 
factors he is utilizing would be subject to much fluctuation, in what appears to be 
unpredictable ways. Thus he even suggests a possibility that “what a term means 
must be resolved on a case-by-case basis” in reference to speakers’ dispositions to 
defer (p. 622). Thus, even if it were possible to formalize the externalist factors 
Lassiter is relying on, no systematic account of these changes seems to be on the 
horizon as his notions are not precisely formulated, let alone explained, which 
again undermines the scientific significance of the notions employed by Lassiter.  
 These are all insurmountable problems facing the ‘theory’ Lassiter propo-
ses. He fails to provide convincing arguments for the feasibility or legitimacy of 
constructing an externalist linguistic theory of the sort he envisages. For these 
reasons, we find it particularly puzzling to see Lassiter’s remark in his con-
clusion: “Chomsky […] insists that only the ‘internalist’ aspects of language can 
admit of a truly scientific description. I have attempted to provide several 
counter-examples to this claim in the form of explanations of problems that 
cannot be addressed or even formulated without externalist concepts“ (p. 631). 
His “counter-examples” (the facts relevant to (A)) are orthogonal to Chomskyan 
internalism, which just amounts to “the methodological decision […] to study less, 
prior to studying more: To study the organism, prior to the infinitely more 
complex task of studying how it embeds in a social, physical, and cultural 
surrounding”, to borrow Hinzen’s (2006a: 161) words (cf. Collins 2009). Lassiter 
also fails to demonstrate why internalists have to worry about his “counter-
examples”, nor does he convince us of how the sociolinguistic theory that he 
envisages can be explanatory, going beyond case-by-case descriptions. 
 We take Lassiter’s contribution to be somewhat important, since, contra 
Lassiter’s own intention, its failure is actually quite suggestive of a much more 
general conclusion: namely the absence of explanations or even descriptions that 
go beyond common sense in externalist approaches such as Lassiter’s. We 
suspect that any account that ever tries to address such I-language-external 
complex phenomena as community standards or speakers’ intentions would be 
relevantly like Lassiter’s, and would fail in the same ways as Lassiter’s does. This 
point is plainly another corroboration of the conclusion by Wittgenstein in 
Philosophical Investigations: There is no theory of the domain of language use, 
apart from just more or less helpful description (McGilvray 1998: 228; cf. 
Chomsky 1995: 27). 
 However, as noted, Lassiter’s failure has no bearing on the internalist 
research enterprise. His attempt to articulate a sociolinguistic theory of the sort 
he envisages is orthogonal to the goal of internalist investigations of the 
Chomskyan sort, which is to provide a naturalistic scientific theory of I-language. 
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We should, though, make it clear that this assessment is an assessment of 
Lassiter’s particular sociolinguistic theory, and in particular his unwarranted and 
misguided intention of replacing the internalist project. It is perfectly possible 
that a different kind of sociolinguistics might emerge that makes explicit its 
dependence on, or its supplementary nature to, internalist inquiry. Moreover, it 
might also turn out to be the case that some of the work that is done by people 
working on language use will turn out to be grounded in phenomena that can be 
investigated within an internalist approach to language. In any case, socio-
linguistics suggests no alternative to the internalist science of language. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper was primarily to emphasize the methodological aspect 
of internalism. To repeat, internalists never deny that there are complicated social 
aspects in the domain of language use; they just decide not to let these 
unexplainable aspects of language use enter into their naturalistic theory at the 
present stage of inquiry: “Naturalistic inquiry is a particular human enterprise 
that seeks a special kind of understanding, attainable for humans in some few 
domains when problems can be simplified enough” (Chomsky 1995: 10). Thus, 
focusing on I-language (i.e. taking an internalist approach) is primarily a metho-
dological decision, as we have argued above. And within this domain of study, 
any I-language-external phenomena such as speakers’ intentionality and pre-
scriptive pressures by the linguistic community are of rather little interest. Thus 
internalists decide to abstract away from these complicating factors when they 
study their object of inquiry, just as physicists abstract away from various factors 
such as colors and smells when they study motion and movement of physical 
objects; an abstraction that is not a scientific necessity. We have argued that 
Lassiter’s criticism of internalism is off the point, based on the serious misrepre-
sentation of Chomsky’s position as L-individualism. Rather, the significance of 
Lassiter’s ‘contribution’, if any, lies in his demonstration that the I-language-
external conceptions of linguistic meaning might well be beyond the reach of 
naturalistic inquiry.  
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